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Abstract: The current paper contributes to the recent discussion in the US which has to do with the 
level of efficiency of the QE practices being implemented since 2008 and afterwards until today. It also 
analyses the basic argumentation of the academics and social and political groups who are in favour of 
the restoration of the Gold Standard. Thus, the analysis offers a critical approach concerning the US 
monetary practices linked to the implementation of the gold standard regimes as against to the 
quantitative easing policies. We conclude that although there are both arguments in favour of or against 
the abandonment of the QE policies in the US, the implementation (through restoration) of the Gold 
standard doctrines is very difficult to materialize, especially when an economy faces or has already 
faced the negative and detrimental side-effects of recession. 
 
1. Introduction 
Few people could deny that one of the basic issues of modern economic policy 
matters in international politics is the implementation of non-conventional monetary 
policy measures in a great number of developed countries. 
The 2008 financial crisis in the US entailed sweeping consequences which were 
diffused as a domino effect to the global economy. This started with the denial of the 
US government to save from bankruptcy the Lehman Brothers. Since then, using 
interest rates as a mechanism of implementing monetary policy has become less 
effective than expected. The steep denial of the vicious cycle of absorbing the 
liabilities of a series of banks and insurance companies (with huge turnovers) by the 
US Treasury in order to save them from bankruptcy strengthened the necessity of the 
US central bank being the basic regulator of economic affairs. The global effect of 
such a decision in the US should also be recognized.  
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Many (mostly liberal) economists strongly criticize the intervention of state 
authorities in the manipulation of the central banks policies (Buchanan 2010, pp. 255-
257; Bitros 2015).1 The economic rationality that exceeds the variable limits of the 
Taylor’s Rule2, which was the basic tool of implementing interest rate policies for 
many years, seems to be as the only rescue measure of economies with events that are 
strongly related with moral hazard, such as the case of rescuing Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae by the US government (which transferred the burden of their rescuing to 
the American tax-payers). 
It appears that the current crisis offers a promising opportunity of finding a 
common point between economic policy and psychology due to the primary 
importance that people’s expectations play in the interpretation of monetary policy 
which is accompanied by income and social implications.  
A series of older liberal economists such as Simons (1936), Eucken (1952) and 
Friedman (1959) had strongly criticized the intervention of the central banking 
authority to the functioning of the free market, as being unproductive. Modern 
scholars such as Kydland και Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978) and Barro και Gordon 
(1983), Minsky ([1986] 2008), Buchanan (2010) and Bitros (2015) argued that when 
the state’s monetary policy is performed under fair rules, this leads to the credible 
implementation of the monetary policy itself, which then leads to the best long term 
results. In contrast, they also argue that under a state intervention regime, the 
monetary policymakers could be carried away to the satisfaction of short-term goals, 
                                                          
1 The current British legislation takes away the privilege of the central bank to implement policies 
without having any institutional commitment of ccounting by the British parliament concerning the 
actions and the policies being implemented by its policymakers. See 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/bank-of-england-proposals-to-bolster-transparency-and-
accountability-welcomed-by-chancellor 
2 The Taylor Rule is based on the empirical evaluation of the monetary policy being implemented by 
the Fed during 1987 – 1992.  According to it, the short-term interest rate is depended on the current 
level of market prices, the real interest rate, and furthermore, from the divergences of inflation and the 
level of production from the inflation-target and the potential rate of productivity. It has been proved 
that the Taylor Rule is capable enough to efficiently describe the implementing monetary policy, 
during the last decades. See Taylor (1999). 
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that is, to be tempted to implement discretional policy against rules, something which 
would increase economic uncertainty in the long-run.3  
Minsky ([1986] 2008) argues that the central bank should play a more regulatory 
and stabilizing role, in which it fails. Minsky and Kaufman (2008), and Mehrling 
(2010) argue that the only trustworthy mechanism of creating leverage in the financial 
credit system is the central bank itself. Thus the central bank must be the only 
institutional mechanism which should determine money supply and credit 
mechanisms.  
On the other hand, according to Werner (2012) any discretional monetary policy 
must be related to economic development policies which increase social welfare and 
on the meantime, avoid any kind of inflationary side effect. If this side effect takes 
place this leads to excessive rise on market prices (which reduces the purchasing 
power of the consumers) and excessive rise on the price of equities, thus leading to a 
transfer of wealth from the inadequately informed people concerning these changes, 
to the most wealthy and affluent social strata which have better information 
concerning market changes, thus they are being benefitted in terms of asymmetrical 
information. 
According to Syriopoulos and Papadamou (2014) there is a serious dilemma 
between the central bank overall strategy: either implementing rules, or “discretional” 
monetary policy, that is quantitative easing.4 Thus, the basic question on which this 
article focuses is the causality (or not) between QE and economic performance. More 
specifically, by focusing on the US case, the article offers a critical view as far as the 
QE policies that were introduced by the US policies since 2008 and afterwards are 
concerned. Were they beneficial to the recovery of the American economy or not and 
                                                          
3 Βitros (2015) offers a very detailed recent analysis on these issues. He argues, (pp. 84-85) among 
others, in favour of  the “upgrade” of the Fed as a “forth checks and balances” authority to the already 
three current US political institutions (Congress, Senate and Supreme Court) with the view to securitize 
its independence and on parallel, to secure fiscal transparency and harmony in economic affairs and 
decision making. 
4 The term quantitative easing (QE) denotes the decision of the central bank to increase the money 
supply in the market by buying securities such as state bonds in order to increase liquidity, and thus, 
boosting further the purchasing power of people. In other words, QE can increase aggregate demand in 
the market and thus the overall consumption and possibly, the GDP. A consequence of a QE policy is a 
controlled rise of the level of inflation, when the interest rates cannot be further reduced (when they 
tend to reach the zero point or they have been already possessing a negative return.  
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how this discussion is related to those who are in favour of the restoration of some 
kind of a Gold Standard regime? 
In the following sections we expand our argumentation. In section 2 we offer a 
brief history of the Gold Standard implementation in the US. The analysis takes into 
account the basic arguments in favour or against the Gold Standard as they are 
attested by modern literature. Then is section 3 we offer arguments in favour or 
against the implementation of a kind of Gold Standard in the US while simultaneously 
abandoning the QE policy since 2008 and afterwards. Section 4 offers a series of 
conclusions that are based on the previous sessions argumentation. 
 
2. The Gold standard regime in the US and the Fed in brief5 
After the 2008 financial crisis in the US and the slow and low growth rates of 2% of 
GDP in contrast to the Obama administration predictions for a higher GDP growth 
during the 2009-14 period6, there is an intense and ongoing discussion which is 
related to how and to what degree the successive QE measures that were being 
introduced in 2008, 2010 και 2012 had an undeniably beneficial outcome in favour of 
the American economy, or the opposite.  
Gradually, since 2008 those who were against the QE policies found strong support 
through the argumentation of cycles and political groups who were advocates of the 
returning to the Gold Standard, such as the influential Republican politician Ron Paul, 
who used the Gold Standard argumentation in 2012 political campaign.7 Additionally, 
one has to bear in mind the very serious fact, that during his campaign for the 
American Presidential election of November 2016, Donald Trump argued many times 
in favour of the Gold Standard practices.8  Now, being already the new US President, 
                                                          
5 Selgin (2013) offers a detailed analysis as to the rise and the fall of the Gold Standard Rule. 
6 https://www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/publications/notesfromthevault/1110.aspx,   
http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/great-recession.html#.VouldvmLTcs 
7 For the arguments of the advocates in favour of returning to the Gold Standard one can see 
https://americanprinciplesproject.org/gold-blog/ralph-benko-argues-for-gold-on-procon/ and 
http://gold-standard.procon.org/#pro_con. For an interesting discussion and contradictory 
argumentation between Ron Paul and Paul Krugman on this issue, see 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WEoGKpnutyA. For Ron Paul’s views see Paul and Lehrman 
(1982). 
8 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marvin-meadors/ted-cruz-really-wants-to-_b_8426016.html 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/11/gop-debate-gold-standard/415386/ 
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it remains to be seen if he is up to adopt in practice Gold Standard doctrines and 
practices. 
Since this issue still finds many and influential supporters in the economy and the 
American politics, this gives us the stimulus for a short description of the Gold 
Standard in the US since 1781 to the abolishment of the Bretton Woods agreement in 
1971.  
First of all, the main principle of the gold standard regime is that the amount of 
money which circulates in the economy is based on a stable quantity of gold. Gold 
and silver were preferable since the antiquity due to its rarity, durability, divisibility, 
interchangeability and ease of identification. For 5,000 years, gold's combination of 
luster, malleability, density and scarcity has captivated humankind like no other metal 
(Bernstein 2004). 
During the 1780’s the Founding Fathers, Thomas Jefferson, Robert Morris and 
Alexander Hamilton recommended to Congress to adopt a kind of standard, either 
gold, silver or both. The United States adopted a silver standard based on the Spanish 
milled dollar in 1785. Then, a major change took place due to the American Civil War 
(1861-1865). Due to necessity to subsidize the war effort, in July 1861 the United 
States Congress authorized $50.000.000 in demand notes. They bore no interest, but 
could be redeemed for specie “on demand”. This paper money was called the 
“greenbacks” due to that they were printed in green on the back. However, after the 
Civil War, which ended with the victory of the United States against the 
Confederates, the Congress reestablished the gold standard at pre-war rates. The 
market price of gold in greenbacks was above the pre-War fixed price ($20.67 per 
ounce of gold) requiring deflation to achieve the pre-war price. 
Then in 1907, the so-called Panic of 1907, also known as the 1907 Bankers' Panic 
or Knickerbocker Crisis, took place, where the New York Stock Exchange fell almost 
50% from its peak the previous year being accompanied by an extensive bank run. 
Thus, to alleviate the crisis and in order to avoid a new crisis, the American 
policymakers decided to establish the Federal Reserve System (Fed) as the new 
central banking system of the United States. Fed is a self-funding institution created 
on December 23, 1913, with the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act. The Fed is an 
                                                                                                                                                                      
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/29/is-it-really-time-for-a-return-of-the-gold-standard.html 
http://www.wealthdaily.com/articles/do-republicans-want-a-return-to-the-gold-standard/6346 
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autonomous institution which exercises a series of major duties which include: 1) 
implementing monetary policy 2) issuing money 3) supervising and regulating 
banking and financial institutions 3) providing payments services to financial 
institutions. 
The US preserved the Gold Standard rule during the World War I, in contrast to 
many European countries which were forced to abandon it such as Great Britain due 
to the need to finance extensively the war effort.9 The US managed to stay strict to the 
Gold Standard principle. Fed intervened in currency markets and sold bonds to 
alleviate the effect of the gold imports which would have otherwise increased the 
stock of money. This proved an effective policy. By 1927 many countries had 
returned to the gold standard.  
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 543) and Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003) 
argued that the Gold Standard limited the flexibility of the central banks' monetary 
policy by limiting their ability to expand the money supply. Robert Mundell (1968, 
pp. 101-102) also argued that “the Great Depression affected the government 
institutions of the major countries and brought to the forefront the responsibility of 
the government for preserving the stability of the economy. Today every government 
regards itself as responsible for the prevention of severe depressions and the control 
of inflation……The problem of government policy, therefore, is to manage aggregate 
demand and supply so as to eliminate excess supply during a depression and excess 
demand during inflation”. 
He also argued that “the gold standard had been destroyed in World War I.  The 
world political authorities replaced it with a grotesque caricature, the gold-exchange 
standard. This tragically spiraled into the great depression, devolving to the rise of 
Hitler and world war. Had the price of gold been raised in the late 1920's, or, 
alternatively, had the major central banks pursued policies of price stability instead 
of adhering to the gold standard, there would have been no Great Depression, no 
Nazi revolution and no World War II” (Mundell 2000). 
                                                          
9 Alain Greenspan, ex-Fed Chairman (1978-2006) blamed the UK’s strategy during WWI, actually, as 
a betrayal of the Golden Standard. He argued that “Great Britain fared even worse, and rather than 
absorb the full consequences of her previous folly, she abandoned the gold standard completely in 
1931, tearing asunder what remained of the fabric of confidence and inducing a world-wide series of 
bank failures” (Branden & Greenspan 1986). 
7 
 
Thus Mundell accepts Keynes’s argumentation to blame the Entente allies in 1919 
who were demanding huge war compensations by Germany, which led to the rapid 
deterioration of the German economy, the fall of the short-lived Weimar Republic and 
the rise of the Third Reich in 1933. The collapse of the Weimar Republic proves that 
democracy, in order to flourish needs a strong economic base as many scholars such 
as Barro (1997), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) 
argue, adding that economic growth is correlated with the rule of law and the 
protection of property argue. 
In 1929 the Great Depression took place in the US, which drifted many other 
economies in economic depression as well. In the US, the central bank was required 
by the Federal Reserve Act (1913) to have gold backing 40% of its demand notes. 
Some economic historians, such as Eichengreen (1992) blame the gold standard of the 
1920’s for preventing the economy to revive after the 1929 Crash. This policy of 
compliance, he argued, lasted for about a decade, and prevented the Fed from 
expanding the money supply to stimulate the economy, fund insolvent banks and 
government deficits.  
The chaos during the 1930’s was highly criticized by Milton Friedman and the 
Chicago School who were strongly arguing in favour of freely-fluctuating fiat 
currencies and cutting all ties to gold, leave the absolute control of each national 
currency in the hands of its central government, issuing fiat money as legal tender and 
then advise each government to allow its currency to fluctuate freely with respect to 
all other fiat currencies (Friedman and Schwartz 1963). Barry Eichengreen (1992, p. 
4), in accordance to Freedman and Schwartz, argued: “Far from being synonymous 
with stability, the gold standard itself was the principal threat to financial stability 
and economic prosperity between the wars”.10 
Gregory Mankiw11 claimed that “probably the most important source of recovery 
after 1933 was monetary expansion, eased by President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
decision to abandon the gold standard and devalue the dollar. From 1933 to 1937, 
the money supply rose, stopping the deflation. Production in the economy grew about 
10 percent a year, three times its normal rate”. All these views support the idea that 
                                                          
10 One has to bear in mind that Eichengreen’s approaches are strongly determined by his Keynesian 
economic thinking. See also Eichengreen (1985). 
11http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/26/business/worldbusiness/26iht-
26view.17244116.html?pagewanted=all 
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the abandonment of gold standard doctrine was beneficial for economic recovery and 
growth. Mankiw (2012) also argued that the Great Depression was caused not only 
due to the monetary restrictive policy as the Chicago School and Friedman argued, 
but also due to the simultaneous fiscal restrictive policy, as the government was 
insisting in achieving balanced budgets instead of increasing public expenditures and 
investment. 
The outbreak of World War II ended the Depression and allowed countries to go 
back to a modified gold standard. During World War II, Fed used some free gold to 
purchase bonds and drive interest rates down to help the treasury finance the war. A 
critical point for the future of the post-war international economies was the Bretton 
Woods Agreement12 signed in 22 July 1945 and then ratified by the Congress. The 
new system was essentially the gold-exchange standard of the 1920s but with the 
dollar rudely displacing the British pound as the key currency globally.  
Under this system, many countries fixed their exchange rates relative to the US 
dollar and central banks could exchange dollar holdings into gold at the official 
exchange rate of $35 per ounce. All currencies pegged to the dollar thereby had a 
fixed value in terms of gold. In other words, although one couldn't buy gold in the 
United States, other governments were entitled to take US dollars and insist on 
delivery of gold. With the new agreement, the dollar was no longer redeemable in 
gold to American citizens. 
The rules of Bretton Woods were accompanied by the establishment of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD), provided for a system of fixed exchange rates. Since 1971, 
the market price of gold had never been below the old fixed price of $35 an ounce. 
Then, due to the fact that the US wanted to implement new social programs 
(developed by President Lindon B. Johnson), the Vietnam War (which led to a major 
increase in the US defence expenditures and the rise oil prices the US policymakers 
wanted to spend more money than they could spend under the Bretton Woods 
constraints. 
Other reasons for the abandonment of the Bretton Woods were: the continuing 
American inflation, which began to turn the tide of international trade and the 
administration of President Charles de Gaulle during 1959-1969, who wanted France 
                                                          
12 For the Bretton Woods agreements see among others, Bordo and Eichengreen (1993). 
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to return in the Gold Standard (and for that purpose France reduced its dollar 
reserves). All these led President Richard Nixon to announce the end of the 
international convertibility of the US dollar to gold on August 15, 1971 (the so called 
Nixon Shock).13 The dollar subsequently floated. In December 1971, the Smithsonian 
Agreement was reached. In this agreement, the dollar was devalued from $35 per 
ounce of gold to $38. Other countries' currencies appreciated.  
 
3. QE or returning to the Gold Standard: The theoretical discussion 
Richard Werner (2012) argues that the Fisher’s Equation14 can be divided in two 
parts: the real value of money and the inflationary part of it, which is based on credit 
creation eg. offering loans to possible investors through banking.  Credit is a tool and 
an institutional mechanism of the monetary authorities and banks which dates back to 
as old times as the antiquity15 which boosts commercial activity and replaces barter 
transactions, thus reducing cost in commercial and economic transactions.  
Thus, the intermediator between the lending and borrowing groups in an economy, 
that is, the banks, must be capable to supervise the credibility of financial 
transactions. Historically the role of monetary authorities was performed through 
central banks either in a critical or a less critical degree and efficiency.  
When the monetary authorities introduce efficient supervising mechanisms of 
issuing money and simultaneously protecting it from forgery, this leads to healthy 
economic environment where commercial transactions are effective and prodigal and 
in the meantime, deception is avoided. Thus the consequences of moral hazard are 
prevented by trustworthy transactions which are supervised by the central and private 
banks. This means that when a trustworthy mechanism of issuing money and 
                                                          
13 According to Hazlitt and Koether (2012) the Bretton Woods attempt to fix exchange rates and peg 
world currencies to the dollar, which in turn was fixed to gold, would not last because it was not a 
viable system. For the Bretton Woods agreement, its problems and its final abandonment see also 
(Garber 1993). 
14 The Fisher's Quantity Theory of Money main principle is that the money demand is created by the 
need to hold an efficient amount of cash flows so as to perform economic transactions for a specific 
period of time. The basic typology is:  M • V = P • Q, where: Μ is money supply, ποσότητα χρήματος, 
V is velocity of circulation of money, that is, the number of times a unit of money changes its hand, Ρ 
is average or general price level or index of prices and Q denotes the quantities of individual goods. 
15 For example, in the Athenian democracy (508-322 BCE) there was in existence a fully developed 
financial credit system (Cohen 1997).  
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protecting commercial transactions is established, the money multiplier procedure can 
work efficiently and prove to be beneficial, limiting its inflationary and unfair growth 
distribution character.  
On the other hand, money devaluation in combination with non-conventional QE 
measures leads to further devaluation of national currencies. Due to this, people need 
to work and try harder so that they produce more and increase their personal income 
and wealth with a final goal, to counterbalance the loss of purchasing power they face 
because of the devaluation of the national currency. This has a positive and a negative 
effects concerning entrepreneurship: it increases the overall profits and wealth of the 
“too big to fail” (TBTF) private companies and thus it reduces any danger that they 
might face, whereas it reduces the profits and increases danger of possible failures to 
lower income socioeconomic classes and groups. This means, in other words, that the 
inflationary policies that may be caused by QE policies may lead to income losses, 
loss of wealth and thus, increase of poverty for the majority of people (since the 
wealthy consist a small part of society).  
Seeing it from another perspective, such a situation could also have happened even 
under the Gold Standard regime in case that the state authorities had adverse motives,  
The latter means they could seek to devaluate money without informing people in 
order to finance e.g. war expenses. Seigniorage allows authorities to benefit from new 
coins without informing the state’s citizens who are susceptible to receiving lower 
intrinsic but same nominal value devaluated money. By reducing coins intrinsic value, 
the same amount of metal would correspond to the same currency value as before. 
Therefore, real value would inevitably be diminished, so would common consumers 
purchasing power. This way, relative income changes between economic agents 
(government and citizens) would alter disproportionally, and income inequalities 
between them would arise.  
On the other hand, if seen by a different angle, lower purchasing power could 
result for the government via taxation. Differently said, money devaluation under the 
gold standard would help taxpayers work less than before to attain same level of 
income, but force them to consume less. At the same time, a higher proportion of real 
income would be attributed to the government via indirect taxes and incentives to 
work harder would attenuate. This way, less income would gradually be given to 
public authorities, especially if the marginal propensity to consume was high (this 
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happens mainly in low income societies such as ones being in crises). As a result, 
fiscal authorities’ attempt to reduce public debt would prove to be a failure.  
It would be really difficult to claim that credit can be expanded as fast as total debt. 
While financial intermediaries can generate nominal value out of a really small 
amount of money, debt is growing even faster and taxpayers have to bear this extra 
burden. This means that the beneficial effects of credit creation cannot be able to 
counterbalance the harmful effects of big debts increase due to bailing out decisions.  
Credit instruments give rise to investment but because high leverage values at risk 
increase too fast for big enterprises. This latter phenomenon is greatly helped by 
moral hazard incentives helped by inadequate regulation. This leads to the conclusion 
that from a total social utility perspectives, losses for taxpayers are higher than 
benefits from economic growth.  
This discussion is also related with the democratic background and transparency in 
decision making. For example, someone could pose the following questions: to what 
degree the American tax-payers approved the successive QE decisions of the US 
government during 2008, 2010 and 2011? And how inclined they did were to approve 
to undertake through increasing taxation (which entailed losses in their personal 
incomes and purchasing power) the bailout of some financial giant banks and 
insurance companies such as the AIG (the bailout cost 85 billion dollars), Fannie Mae 
και Freddie Mac (the bailout for both cost more than 125 billion dollars)? And who 
and under which mechanism (not known to the median American tax-payer) the US 
government decided to save AIG, Fannie Mae και Freddie Mac instead of bailing out, 
say, Lehman Brothers? 
These are difficult questions to be answered in a simplistic way since they have 
various more and less well-known extra implications which appears to have shaped 
the final decision making in the minds of the US policymakers, mainly, the Obama 
administration. But in general, when such decisions are taking place without being 
introduced under a wider democratic spectrum of transparency, it seems that the social 
losses are higher than the prospective long term gains. 
If instead of implementing the QE doctrines a Gold Standard approach might have 
been adopted, it could possibly impede such a huge expansion of credit, while on the 
same time not harming the volume of the overall transactions and money exchanges 
within the economy. This could be feasible if the Fed could effectively supervise the 
money market in order to ensure stability.  
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Furthermore, the US imports could increase the amount of dollars abroad (in the 
global economy, such as China). Theoretically, this could be to the benefit of 
achieving low inflations rates. And trade deficits could be paid by issuing new 
amounts of gold, providing that new discoveries of gold could be made in the US (or 
elsewhere but being exploited by the US authorities). 
However, according to our view, since the current US trade balance is negative, 
43.4 billion dollars for the fiscal year 201516, a huge sum in absolute terms, utilizing 
Gold Standard practices could mean that the US government and the Fed could not 
issue more money, in order to cover the huge trade balance. This would entail to 
deflation (negative inflation). But deflation could be harmful and dangerous to the 
economy since it reduces the real value of money over time, which practically means 
that the short term consumption could be postponed by the homo oeconomicus US 
consumers which could behave rationally, that is to benefit by purchasing more goods 
with the same money in the future. 
Thus, taking into account Eichengreen’s point of view (section 2) this might lead 
to a new Great Recession such as in the 1930s due to the restrictive monetary policies 
being imposed by the Gold Standard. As it is well-known the USA returned in the 
Gold Standard with an underrated exchange rate in 1934 (after an intermediate period 
of a floating exchange rate in 1933) under the presidency of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt. Thus as the Great Depression showed, the Gold Standard proved 
unsuccessful to offer tangible and practical solutions so as to exit the crisis.  
However, if we are based on historical facts, we could support an opposite view, 
that since the establishment of the federal reserve of the USA in 1913, a stronger tie to 
the gold standard should have been maintained. Abiding by this view, percentages as 
regards required minimum reserves are to blame for the Great Depression since these 
led to hyperinflation and a necessity to abandon the gold standard in order for the 
exchange rates to be adjusted. Especially from 1870 to 1914, is a period thought as 
one with great economic development without inflation. 
In accordance with the bank reform plan of the Chicago School, a banking system 
with full reserves would attract all deposits and make it easier to separate financial 
intermediaries into investment banks and savings banks.  This would help to augment 
liabilities and interest paying to public by issuing internal debt, preventing inflation 
                                                          
16 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/balance-of-trade 
13 
 
this way. Commercial banks would be able to create credit but not debt, in this 
manner. As Irving Fisher argues, the School of Chicago suggested reforms would 
delineate business cycles, prevent bank runs and shrink public as well as private debt. 
After the 2008 crisis the increasing trend against the QE practices as a means of 
raising an overall economy’s income is mainly due to the financial crises which are 
often being caused by an excessive QE strategy. Thus, in that case, people tend to 
withhold their deposits out of the banking system since they feel insecure about the 
safety of their wealth. This leads inevitably into investment “shrinking” which harms 
long term economic growth. 
Some scholars and ordinary people tend to believe that without inflation economic 
stability can be achieved and safeguarded. They also think that this stability can be 
related by resetting the Gold Standard as a main monetary mechanism. However, this 
belief could be compatible to those who are just risk averters and avoid any 
investment in banking or entrepreneurial activity. In such a case, any kind of 
reduction of deposits in private banks could potentially cause private banks incapable 
to offer a sufficient amount of cash money to their customers, thus it may lead to the 
emergency situation of causing the central bank to intervene in the financial market 
by “infusing” money as a lender of last resort in order to increase the liquidity of 
private banks. 
However, if this happens, as the current Greek economic crisis example proves, 
(with the harmed banking sector and the capital controls that were imposed on it in 
order to save private banks from a possible “disorderly bankruptcy”) it will be 
accompanied by increased taxation which it will mostly harm those with lower 
personal incomes and wealth, that is, the majority of the people.  
Under such a perspective, imposing higher taxation so as to save the banking 
system from collapse could be an effective measure but it could also be seen as an 
undemocratic policy since it actually imposes a further tax burden to citizens, which is 
something that obviously is not the result of transparent procedures between the tax-
payers (the people), the authority (the government) and the central bank (in our case 
the Fed), thus there is no a consent building decision making and this is a lack in 
democratic legitimization.  
Thus the Gold Standard regime presupposes that those that they have money 
available to deposit, they must choose to offer them to the banks so as to feed the 
banking system with the necessary amounts of money in order to make it capable to 
14 
 
transform it into investment by offering loans to potential investors and businessmen. 
As an exchange, depositors receive safety and some additional earning due to interest 
rates on their wealth. 
However, we have to acknowledge that there is always some kind of risk when 
someone chooses to offer his wealth in the banking system. Under abnormal 
economic periods, there is always a possibility for a “haircut” in deposits.17 There is 
also the possibility that banks don’t make a prudent and wise management of their 
deposits-assets, possibly because they choose to invest some or much of these assets 
to high risky funds in order to be benefitted by their high returns. Thus, in order to 
increase their profits they may endanger the safety of the money of their customers-
depositors. Thus, there are always moral hazard problems due to the safeguard (or 
not) of the investors’ deposits. 
Thus according to our view, there is not an optimal solution to be adopted by these 
policymakers that they have to implement any national monetary policy. When a QE 
policy is being adopted it may boost consumption (and thus the commercial activity in 
the market) and may strengthen investment opportunities being offered by the 
banking system, thus both outcomes may be beneficial for the economy in the long 
term, but it may also lead to a side-effect: the rise of inflation which may harm 
economic performance and disintegrate economic policies. 
On the other hand, adopting the Gold Standard vs the QE, may stabilize the 
economy. It may guarantee a series of issues such as keeping a stable currency that 
allows for proper savings and investment by “keeping the bankers honest” in their 
responsibilities to citizens-investors, and avoiding excessive public expenditures 
(such as hiring civil servants and creating bureaucracies) and in generally, it favors 
stability over growth.  
But one has to bear in mind that, the biggest danger with the gold standard is 
deflation, which would encourage people to sit on resources rather than invest. The 
paradigm and the consequences to the global economy of the Great Depression of 
1929-33 is one of the most important laboratories of thinking in favour of the 
opponents of the Gold Standard and to those that are in favour of state intervention in 
the economy (eg., many neo-keynsianists) or the defendants of the QE.  
                                                          
17 Such a kind of policy was prevented in today’s Greece just in the last moment (June 2015) after the 
imposition of the capital controls in the banking system. 
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Our analysis, having taking into account a series of different views and 
approaches, indicates that the Gold Standard is not suitable to be implemented in 
cases that have to do with a highly problematic economy such as that of Greece after 
2010. It could lead to further recession and to deeper crisis.  
Thus, we agree with the proposal of Buchanan (2010) and Bitros (2015) as far as 
the institutional “upgrade” of the Fed is concerned, as a fourth institution of checks 
and balances in the US political system (the other being the Congress, the Senate and 
the Supreme Court). This could secure the Fed’s independence accompanied by fiscal 
transparency and harmony by its members concerning decision making in high (top) 
level issues that are related with the overall implementation of the monetary policy in 
the USA. 
 
3. Conclusions 
This article attempts to look into the level of inflationary monetary policy effect by 
QE on economy in comparison to a Gold Standard. Our analysis provides a critical 
theoretical background for the interpretation of intense deteriorating social inequality 
phenomena.  
As it is shown, the issue of decision-making transparency on monetary policy 
issues seems to be positively related to increasing moral hazard deriving from 
irrational credit expansion, by central banks unconventional policies. Nevertheless, 
the crucial matter is whether under credit constraint and non-flexible policies the 
results would be worse.  
Could the “poison”, that is bad-managed credit that caused serious economic 
illness, be converted to favorable means for growth and work as an antidote? The 
answer is affirmative yet only under some strict conditions that has proven as difficult 
to be followed. The issue of implementing quantitative easing or alternative measures 
in the USA could be addressed based on a preference critical point.  
This is the point where economic units consider inflation and nominal expenses 
growth as non-preferable compared to stability, lack of taxation shocks and low 
liquidity. Transparency concerning income and decision-making must be attained as a 
Pareto efficient result, that means in a way that no better outcome could be reached 
for one party without hurting another. In this result, negative externalities about 
democratic decision making that TBTF companies bail-outs bring about, should be 
eliminated. Finally, the Fed’s constitutional upgrade to a fourth fundamental 
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institutional tool of ‘’checks and balances’’ could contribute in a favorable and 
harmonic manner towards this direction. 
These views form a number of ways by which optimal, under the prism of 
transparency in decision-making results follow the same path as driven by credit 
allocation economically optimal results.  
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